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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper examines pricing differences regarding contingencies presented in statements of 
financial position or notes, which are considered an area for creative accounting.  
 
Design/Methodology/approach: We have chosen two countries with different cultural environments to 
test our exploratory study. Our sample includes companies using the International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 37, which requires recognition of provisions but only the disclosure of contingent liabilities implying 
different impacts from underlying judgement related with contingencies. We apply a regression model 
based on the Ohlson equity-valuation framework.  
 
Findings: The most important conclusion is that market participants in both countries follow different 
patterns when incorporating information about provisions and contingent liabilities. More precisely, our 
results suggest that provisions are value relevant, but incrementally less negative in Portugal. 
Contingent liabilities seem to have no value relevance. But an exception exists for Portuguese 
companies having a risk committee board, in which case a significant market valuation of contingent 
liabilities is found and discounted in share prices. The existence of a risk committee corroborates the 
value relevance of this board, which is positively valued by market participants in both national cultures.  
 
Practical implications: Our findings may make a contribution to the IASB research project on the IAS 37 
and possible amendments to it (suspended until the revisions to the conceptual framework are finalized), 
and to the IASB prioritization of communication effectiveness of financial statements to all their users. 
 
Originality/value: Value relevance of contingencies differentiating between countries from two different 
national cultures and distinguishing firms with a risk committee on the board of directors. 
 
Keywords: Provisions, contingent liabilities, contingencies, creative accounting, national culture, IAS 
37. 
JEL Classification:  M41 – Accounting
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Introduction  
The recognition of “provisions” and the disclosure of “contingent liabilities” have been considered 
sources of creative accounting, primarily because of judgement used on management estimates. We 
perform an exploratory analysis to examine whether market participants incorporate information 
regarding contingencies communicated through financial statements into market prices. We use a 
sample of firms reporting under International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS). First, regarding 
theory, we analyse the effects of recognizing provisions versus disclosing contingent liabilities, and the 
resulting differences in leverage ratios. Then, we analyse the value relevance of those two contingent 
elements, differentiating between countries from two different national cultures. In addition, we 
examine the results distinguishing firms with a risk committee on the board of directors and those 
without, in order to identify whether our results are positively or negatively changed.  
The concept of creative accounting varies and its meaning may differ according to how a 
company communicates information. In a recent speech, Hans Hoogervorst, the Chairman of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), flags the desire for “better communication” of 
financial reporting, saying that “(…) Increasingly, preparers present their investors alternative 
performance measures which are not based on IFRS Standards. This information is easier to 
consume by users, but it almost always paints a rosier picture than reality and can be highly 
misleading” (Hoogervorst, 2016). Some authors (e.g., Gowthorpe & Amat, 2005) also highlight that 
some financial statement preparers deliberately distort the communication and messages delivered by 
financial statements. Thus, it is worth considering the possible impacts of distorted disclosure and 
recognition in financial statements, in particular, those related to the diminishing or augmenting of debt 
values that thereby creates an illusion of stability within the organization that can mislead investors. 
Another issue is related with charges in income when provisions are recognized.  From the accounting 
perspective, some companies do not have to accrue a charge to income for a potential decline in 
economic activity to result, but from a valuation perspective the central attention is whether such 
decline in the economic-wide activity was reasonably predicted (Shaked & Orelowitz, 2015). 
To fit our design, accounting and creativity are considered together when corporate reporting 
uses accounting choices, estimates, and other practices allowed by accounting standards to 
communicate to stakeholders an artificially enhanced financial position through their financial 
statements. Thus far, judgement is inherent in expert behaviour and in management estimates, 
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especially when analysing facts and circumstances involving monetary amounts clearly presented in 
summarized financial statements (e.g., statement of financial position) or “hidden” in mixed disclosures 
for all other events that must be disclosed (e.g., notes). The room for creativity exists because 
subjectivity is widespread. As such, there is a window of opportunity for an entity to employ creative 
accounting using contingent liability disclosure techniques1. Using an expert’s judgement to replace a 
liability clearly presented in the liability section of the statement of financial position (under provisions) 
with nothing other than a mention in the notes section is one of the techniques used by preparers. This 
type of expert judgement is legitimate in some International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). 
The International Accounting Standard (IAS) 37, Provisions, contingent liabilities, and contingent 
assets, issued by IASB, focusses on this very topic. Contingent liabilities are a potentially misleading 
element because, unlike provisions, they are not recognized liabilities. However, they are disclosed 
and may have a long-term impact on companies’ performance. 
Relying on perceptions of market participants on provisions and contingent liabilities, our 
paper contributes to research investigating whether capital market participants evaluate financial 
report disclosures differently from recognized items. This paper extends earlier literature regarding 
valuation of contingencies. In particular, our research introduces a general approach to the value 
relevance of provisions and contingent liabilities in companies of a diverse set of industries in two 
different countries. Earlier research addresses this topic mainly by considering environmental liabilities 
within only a specific country (e.g., Campbell, Sefcik & Soderstrom, 2003; Moneva & Cuellar, 2009; Li 
& McConomy, 1999) and mainly using specific legislation about environment impacts of polluting 
industries. Apart from contaminating industries, Backmon & Vickrey (1997), Banks & Kinney (1982) 
and Frost (1991) are examples of research on the relationship between loss contingencies and market 
values of shares or bonds. Nevertheless, those investigations involved companies using US GAAP, 
and at the time were different from the current international accounting standard on the topic. We 
believe there is still a research gap to fill in the analysis of the relationship between general provisions 
                                                            
1 Empirical research regarding issues that can be under the creative accounting umbrella have covered topics such 
as the recognition versus disclosure process (e.g., Schipper, 2007; Libby et al., 2006; Clor-Proell & Maines, 2014), 
quality of information reported (e.g., Burgstahler et al., 2006; Hope at al., 2013), litigation contingency disclosure 
(e.g., Desir et al., 2010; Hennes, 2014), reduced uncertainty (e.g., Linsmeier et al., 2002), incentives to engage in 
such actions (e.g., Abbody et al., 2004), country-specific factors (Darrought et al., 1998; Kinnunen & Kostela, 2003, 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003), and the effects of disclosures (e.g., Conover et al., 2008; Libby & Brown, 2013). Overall, 
the literature concludes that, notwithstanding major resistance by the preparers of financial statements to corporate 
quantitative disclosures, the accounting information released to the market mitigates information asymmetry and 
improves communication amongst managers, shareholders, and creditors.  
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and contingent liabilities. Our research extends earlier literature, covering companies applying the 
most recent version of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 37 from different industries based on 
ICB Classification and from two different national culture environments. This study also incorporates a 
variable to capture the existence of a risk committee in the board of directors which is considered 
important to control, analyse, and report risks. Research on the value relevance of board committees 
is still scarce (e.g., Chen, Lau & Ng, 2011) but the presence of a separate risk committee may have a 
positive stock market reaction (e.g., Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017) and a positive effect on firm 
performance (e.g., Chowdhury, 2015). No distinction has been drawn between companies with or 
without a risk committee on stock market valuation of companies reporting provisions and 
contingencies.  
This paper also contributes to literature on the influence of national culture on the recognition 
of accounting elements. Our sample includes firms with recognized provisions and/or disclosed 
contingent liabilities. Both can occur simultaneously for different events when applying IAS 37. Our set 
of firms is not subject to changes in IAS 37. These two elements are both subject to the same 
estimate technique for the measurement but to different judgement criteria. Recognition, in turn, is not 
a question of free choice but a judgement on the probability of (non-)occurrence. Earlier research 
reports a distinction between accountants’ application of financial reporting rules to contingencies 
(Tsakumis, 2007) and their interpretation of probability phrases on those topics (Du et al, 2016), with 
both examining the influence of national culture on such a distinction. These studies used Gray’s 
(1988) and Hofstede’s (1980) frameworks to postulate that accountants in different countries are more 
or less likely to recognize contingent liabilities. However, as far as we know, using national culture to 
compare investor perception approaches to these specific elements of financial statements is still a 
breach. We build on this literature and our sample includes firms where market participants operate in 
different cultural environments: Portugal and the United Kingdom. A significant number of studies have 
been published covering cross-cultural research in accounting or auditing (e.g., Eddie, 1990; Pater & 
Psaros, 2000; Salter & Niswander, 1995; Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996; Zarzeski, 1996; Wingate, 1997; 
Jaggi & Low, 2000; Hope, 2003; Tsakumis, 2007; Elshandidy, Fraser & Hussainey, 2014; Khlif, 
Hussainey & Achek, 2015; Khlif, 2016), as well as the problem of recognition and disclosure (e.g., 
Bernard & Schipper, 1994; Choudhary, 2011; Imhoff, Thomas, & Lipe, 1995, Niu & Xiu, 2009). 
Provisions and contingencies have nevertheless received less attention (e.g., Choudhary, 2011; Libby, 
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Nelson, & Hunton, 2006), and research that combines this topic with a view of institutional culture is 
found only in Tsakumis (2007). Our paper thus extends the literature regarding the valuation of 
contingent liabilities (e.g., Campbell, Sefcik & Soderstrom, 2003; Moneva & Cuellar, 2009) by 
incorporating and differencing results between two different culture environments. 
The most important conclusion is that market participants in both countries follow different 
patterns when incorporating information about provisions and contingent liabilities. More precisely, our 
results suggest that provisions are value relevant, but the (negative) relationship with share prices 
found in the United Kingdom is of opposite direction in Portugal (positive). Contingent liabilities seem 
to have no value relevance in either country. But an exception exists for Portuguese firms with a risk 
committee board, in which case a significant market valuation of contingent liabilities is found and 
discounted in share prices. The existence of a risk committee corroborates the value relevance of this 
board, which is positively valued by market participants in both national cultures. We believe these 
results are helpful to the IASB in its research project on the IAS 37 (IFRS Foundation, 2016), which is 
currently at the assessment stage. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the literature 
review, including a brief analysis of IAS 37. Then, research design and explorative expectations are 
presented, including the research method employed, the sample used, and descriptive statistics. 
Following this, results are offered and commented upon before the last section, in which the paper’s 
conclusions are presented. 
 
  
Underpinning literature 
 
Recognition and disclosure requirements (IAS 37) applicable to provisions and contingent 
liabilities 
Under IAS 37 provisions and contingent liabilities are not the same. A contingency may give rise to a 
contingent liability, disclosed and communicated through the notes included in corporate reports. In 
this case, a contingent liability is defined as (1) a possible obligation that arises from past events and 
whose existence will be confirmed only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain 
future events not wholly within the control of the entity; or, as (2) a present obligation that arises from 
6 
 
past events but is not recognized because it is not probable that an outflow of resources in the form of 
economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, and the amount of the obligation cannot be 
reliably measured. However, a contingency also may give rise to a provision, which is recognized and 
communicated in the statement of financial position. In this case, a provision is defined as (3) a 
present obligation, assuming that, although of uncertain timing or amount, a reliable estimate can be 
made, and it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to 
settle the obligation. A contingent liability, as defined in (1) or in (2), falls outside the scope of the 
concept of liabilities, as opposed to a provision as defined in (3). 
This potentially misleading terminology means that whenever a company has a possible 
obligation that arises from past events, and whose existence will be confirmed only by the occurrence 
or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain future events not wholly within the control of the entity, 
that event (and amount) can be disclosed solely in the notes but not included in the total debt of the 
firm. The criterion of probability is used to distinguish between a possible liability that is merely 
disclosed and a probable liability, which is recognized and presented under “provisions” (unless the 
possibility of an outflow is remote, in which case preparers of financial statements do nothing).  
How is the probability threshold assessed? It is based on judgement, taking into account all 
available evidence, where IAS 37 permits decisions based on the opinion of experts (e.g., lawyers), 
upon whom management can call to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that a present 
obligation exists. This is why contingencies are highlighted as a creative accounting technique – 
although not all companies are deliberately using them to reduce apparent debt. Judgement on what 
is probable, possible, or remote is most often left to the opinions of experts, and this judgement is 
based on events that can then be recognized, disclosed, or hidden.  
Theoretically, 51 per cent likelihood or more is probable (Alexander, Britton, Hoogerdoon, & 
Mourik, 2014). In practice, an experiment detected that a Russian participant assigned higher numeric 
value to the word probable than US participants, due to national cultural differences, but their notion of 
remote was very similar (Du et al., 2016). Shaked & Orelowitz (2015) give examples of cases in which 
accounting standards are not necessarily compatible with valuation and solvency analysis, justifying 
why contingent liabilities are critically important. 
To help investors and other users make sense of the numbers, IAS 37 aims to ensure that 
whenever an entity reports a provision or a contingent liability, sufficient information is disclosed in the 
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notes to enable users to understand the nature, timing, and amount of the underlying event. While 
opinions on the acceptability of accounting manipulation vary, it is often perceived as morally 
reprehensible, as it involves an unfair exercise of power, unfairness to users, and undermines 
accounting regulations (e.g., Gowthorpe & Amat, 2005). Even with attempts to establish international 
accounting convergence, caution is required and corporate disclosure needs to be improved on a 
global scale (e.g., Angeloni, 2016) to remove bias in the way users interpret information.  
The following example helps to illustrate the differences between a contingent liability and a 
provision, as well as the respective impacts on income, shareholder equity, and total liabilities. The 
starting point is a real case included in the consolidated financial statements of a group operating in 
the paper supply sector in several European countries and listed on a European Stock Exchange. 
Another entity brought proceedings against the group. However, the group believed (in its own words) 
that this action would have no financial impacts, and, therefore, no provision was made. At the end of 
the fiscal period of 2014, the amount of provisions of the group was “344 thousand” euros, as 
indicated in Panel A of Table 1 (line [5]). This amount represented about 0.07% of total liabilities out of 
“473,140 thousand” euros (line [7]) and about 5% of total assets out of “664,592 thousand” euros (line 
[8]), as reported in Panel A of Table 1. The amounts presented on the face of the statement of 
financial position did not include the financial effects of the claim by the other entity. However, that 
claim, which was contested by the group, had an estimated value of “24.46 million” euros! Note the 
number of units used to describe the currency: all the information on the face of the financial 
statements is presented in thousands, but the amount disclosed in the notes to communicate this 
contingency is in millions.  Additionally, this amount is merely disclosed and has no impact on 
liabilities, equity, or any other financial or performance indicator.  
(Table 1) 
 
 
As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, if this contingent liability had been included in provisions, 
as-if liabilities, the group would present “24,769 thousand” euros in provisions, which is about 4.99% 
of (new) total liabilities, instead of just 0.07%, as reported in Panel A of Table 1 (line [7]) and about 
3.73% of total assets (line [8]). Additionally, the increase in liabilities would be of the same amount, as 
the increase in losses presented in the statement of comprehensive income means that the reported 
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income would drop from a profit of “2,078 thousand” euros to a loss of “22,382 thousand” euros (line 
[3]). Of course, the “more likely than not” criterion regarding the occurrence of a future outflow to settle 
that possible obligation is estimated by the group, but any external user of financial statements should 
be aware of the potential impact of those contingencies on the outflow of resources from the group. 
Panel A and Panel B also demonstrate differences in ratios (lines [9]-[11]), such as return on equity 
(ROE) and leverage, which decreases or increases, respectively, with the inclusion of contingent 
liabilities as-if liabilities.  
As such, creative accounting2 exists not because of the disclosure of the contingency in the 
notes rather than in the statement of financial position, but in the judgement and the arguments used 
by an entity to justify the probability of a possible obligation that is presented out of other liabilities.  
The effect can be similar to hiding certain financing through off-balance sheet financing procedures.  
 
Disclosure versus recognition differences  
Well-documented earlier research focusses on how participants in capital markets use recognized 
versus disclosed amounts. Bratten et al. (2013) summarize at least three views: (1) a “no differences” 
view, in which all information that is reported is used the same way; (2) a “rational differences” view, in 
which information features between recognized and disclosed items are different and such differences 
affect decision usefulness; (3) a “user characteristics” view, in which cognitive factors can induce 
differences in how recognized and disclosed information is used. The second and third need not be 
mutually exclusive. Bernard & Schipper (1994) state that if market participants view footnote 
disclosures as less reliable or not sufficiently sophisticated to make appropriate judgements, they are 
more likely to attribute more importance to recognized items, leading to greater value relevance. This 
is particularly evident when reliability is an issue (e.g., Choi et al., 1997; Davis-Francis et al., 2004; 
                                                            
2 There are two types of definitions for creative accounting - a wider definition used in the United States and 
adopted by Mulford & Comiskey (2002), and a narrower definition adopted in the United Kingdom. According to 
Jones (2010, p. 5) “the wider US definition sees creative accounting as including fraud whereas the UK definition 
sees creative accounting as using the flexibility within the regulatory system, but excludes fraud”. It includes the 
type of flexibility underlying judgements that accounting standards require from those who prepare and 
communicate financial information. An example of detailed accounting techniques can be found in Smith (1998), 
who reported accounting manipulations by 208 of the largest UK companies and identified 12 different techniques 
commonly used. One of the techniques was the use of contingencies. As a consequence, investors and users of 
financial statements may consider income smoothing, earnings management, window dressing, financial 
engineering, aggressive accounting, innovative accounting, or cosmetic accounting as specific types of creative 
accounting (Beidleman, 1973; Mulford & Comiskey, 2002; Jones, 2010; Vladu & Matis, 2010; Vladu&Pelinescu, 
2014; Shafer, 2015). Increasing income, decreasing expenses, increasing assets, and decreasing liabilities are 
four main approaches to engage creativity (Jones, 2010). 
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Ahmed et al., 2006). When reliability is not an issue, i.e., when the disclosed amounts are reliable, 
readily identifiable, and easily processed, investors appear to use these two features similarly (e.g., 
Bratten et al., 2013). This last result is consistent with findings in different locations presenting similar 
information (e.g., Lopes et al., 2013). Other examples of issues related to amounts presented under 
liabilities or equity other than provisions and contingencies include post-retirement benefits obligations 
(e.g., Davis-Francis et al., 2004), derivatives (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2006), stock options (e.g., Choudary, 
2011), lease arrangements (e.g., Bratten et al., 2013) and non-controlling interests (e.g., Lopes et al., 
2013).  
As the criteria for measuring provisions and as-if provisions are the same (see IAS 37), the 
difference is the probability criterion, which is based on judgement and can be considered under the 
creative accounting umbrella. Our paper sheds light on how capital market participants price 
provisions that are recognized, compared to contingent liabilities disclosed, when reliability is not an 
issue but where judgement is used to distinguish those two concepts3. 
  
Capital market participant assessment of provisions and contingent liabilities 
Many financial statement users have complained that existing disclosures are “inadequate or 
ineffective” in helping in the assessment of the likelihood, timing, and amount of loss contingencies 
(Hennes, 2014). Similarly, Wayne Carnall, chief accountant for the SEC’s Division of Corporate 
Finance, advised critics on how companies produce “pages of disclosures” on contingent liabilities that 
“say little”, as cited by Leone (2010). Shipper (2007) adds that required disclosures are not well 
understood, despite the significant amount of information they communicate. Everything can be left to 
the “skill and imagination of the operator that uses the knowledge and experience in the field 
combined with an optimal dose of ingenuity, but also the gaps within legislation” (Adrian et al., 
2002:668). Most of the prior literature uses the association of accounting aggregates with capital-
market effects to empirically assess the usefulness of financial statements.  
                                                            
3 Prior important works document such differences and attempt to explain how these two different presentations 
are used by the capital markets and why the process would be different. Differential processing costs (e.g., Barth, 
Glint & Shibano, 2003), differences in reliability (e.g., Choi et al. 1997; Davis-Friday et al., 2004; Choudhary 
2011), and cognitive biases among investors (e.g., Schipper, K., 2007; Hirshliefer and Teoh, 2013) are highlighted 
as main causes for those differences. These studies usually evaluate items that require estimation, for example, 
(1) post-retirement benefit obligations (e.g., Davis-Friday et al., 2004 recall estimation on future compensation, 
mortality rates, among other factors), and (2) stock options (e.g., Hodder et al., 2006 evoke estimates of volatility, 
interest rates among others). When disclosures are not based on estimates and are amenable to simple 
techniques for imputing as-if recognized amounts (as in leases), disclosed items are not processed differently 
from recognized items (e.g., Bratten et al., 2013). 
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Our setting should link our research to previous analyses that report results on whether 
investors appear to treat contingent liabilities as-if effective liabilities. Campbell, Sefcik, & Soderstrom 
(2003) linked this topic to the potential uncertainty-reducing role of accounting information in a specific 
context of valuation of contingent liabilities in the chemical industry. They conclude that recognizing 
environmental liabilities (provisions), rather than just disclosing them as contingencies, plays a value 
relevant uncertainty-reducing role. And both are differentially effective in reducing different types of 
uncertainty. The value relevance of financial and non-financial environmental reporting was also 
tested by Moneva & Cuellar (2009), who concluded that the market considers provisions and 
contingencies related with environment to be negative factors, considering that this information may 
be linked to potential risks (but did not separate contingencies from provisions). Also, Li &  McConomy 
(1999) found that disclosure of provisions for some environmental information is value relevant (but 
did not cover disclosures only). A different approach was firstly taken by Backmon & Vickrey (1997), 
who analysed the relationship between loss contingency data and bond parameters and found that 
information derived from the annual report (financial statements and footnotes disclosures) may 
provide useful information about increases of risk due to loss contingencies. Research conducted 
under US GAAP, and before the most recent versions of IAS 37, also contribute to this topic. At the 
time, Banks & Kinney (1982) and Frost (1991) found that contingencies disclosed in both the footnotes 
and the auditor’s report had a greater impact on stock prices than footnote disclosures alone. 
Earlier literature, thus, provides evidence that provisions recognized (which give rise to loss 
contingencies accrued to income) and/or contingencies just disclosed (with no impact on elements of 
financial statement) can be value relevant for market participants’ decision making4. At the same time, 
another line of research develops the influence of national culture when analysing contingencies. Our 
paper links the disclosure and valuation literatures by investigating the potential for the cultural 
environment to affect valuation of both provisions and contingencies. This approach most directly 
relates to Tsakumis (2007), who undertakes an experiment regarding the influence of national culture 
on accountants’ practices, although the relationship with market participants remained unexplored. 
                                                            
4 Extensive literature concludes that, despite strong resistance by the preparers of financial statements to 
corporate quantitative disclosures, accounting information released to the market mitigates information 
asymmetry and improves communication amongst managers, shareholders, and creditors (e.g., Darrought et al., 
1998; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Kinnunen & Kostela, 2003; Abbody et al., 2004; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Libby et al., 2006; Schipper, 2007; Conover et al., 2008; Desir et al., 2010; Hope et al., 
2013; Libby & Brown, 2013; Clor-Proell & Maines, 2014; Hennes, 2014). More focused, disclosures of provisions 
and contingencies related to environment plays a value-relevant uncertainty-reducing role (Campbell et al., 2003) 
and are market valued (Moneva & Cuellar, 2010). 
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Tsakumis based his work on Hofstede’s (1980) and Gray’s (1988) frameworks, arguing that 
accountants are expected to apply financial reporting rules in a manner consistent with their cultural 
values. Differences in their cultural values when applying the rules, especially those requiring 
judgment, can lead to different financial reporting decisions. Tsukamis (2007) assumes conservatism 
(a preference for a cautious approach to measurement) and secrecy (a preference for confidentiality 
and the restriction of disclosure of information about the business) as the most important 
characteristics, as did Gray (1988).  
Portugal reveals higher conservatism and secrecy than the United Kingdom, consistent with 
Hofstede’s Dimension scores. Supported in Tsakumis (2007), we also consider the IAS 37 an ideal 
example of a financial-reporting decision task influenced by such cultural factors. We extend prior 
work to analyse how investors price financial reporting decisions that required judgement on the (non-
)recognition of liabilities, along with countries that are also likely to differ in conservatism and secrecy. 
As such, investors need to understand the differences and the impacts of provisions and contingent 
liabilities to price them, and this ability can differ between countries with low and high levels of 
conservatism and secrecy. We build on this idea to identify how stock prices are associated with 
contingencies, and whether there are differences between countries from different cultural 
environments.  
Another explorative impression to address in this study is related with the impact of board 
committees on the value relevance of financial statement information. In European stock exchanges, 
and according to supervisory and regulatory rules, listed firms should all have an audit committee (or 
equivalent) and at least one of the members should be qualified to analyse compliance with 
accounting standards. Overall, one issue of critical importance to this committee is the identification 
and management of financial risks that can affect the firm’s financial reporting.  However, firms can 
also designate specific committees on the board to address specific issues (e.g., Michals, 2009; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Liao, Luo & Tang, 2014), such as risks or litigation. The establishment of 
stand-alone risk committees on boards of directors is increasing, which has an impact on audit fees 
(e.g., Hines, Masli, Mauldin, & Peters, 2015). Little is known about their impact on share prices. The 
presence of a separate risk committee has a positive stock market reaction (e.g., Benaroch & 
Chernobai, 2017) and a positive effect on firm performance (e.g,, Chowdhury, 2015) and are 
associated with greater market risk disclosures (Al-Hadi, Hasan, & Habib, 2016). 
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Our research extends earlier research on environmental contingencies and introduces a 
general approach to the value relevance of provisions and contingent liabilities in entities of a diverse 
set of industries in two different countries. We thus also contribute to the literature on the influence of 
national culture on the recognition of accounting elements. As far as we know, using national culture 
to compare investor perception approaches to provisions and contingent liabilities is still unexplored. 
The analyses will also incorporate an approach to the value relevance of having a risk committee 
board. 
 
 
Research design and expectations 
 
Expected association between equity and provisions and contingent liabilities 
Firms have two different approaches to revealing information about facts surrounding contingencies: 
recognition (i.e., consider as provisions and add them to recognized liabilities) or disclosure (i.e., 
considerer as contingent liabilities and mention them in the Notes). While contingent liabilities do not 
affect the statement of financial position or the income statement, provisions can affect accounting-
based measures of leverage and profitability. When provisions are recognized an increase in liabilities 
occurs simultaneously with a decrease in earnings (and a decrease in shareholder equity). When 
contingent liabilities are disclosed, leverage or profitability remain unchanged, except when users 
process and adjust recognized amounts5 (see Table 1). We explore whether market participants price 
both the recognized liabilities (provisions) and as-if liabilities (contingent liabilities) communicated in 
financial statements. Differences between recognized and disclosed information are most likely to 
                                                            
5 It is important to highlight that investors will not use creative accounting techniques to influence judgment on the 
likelihood of the event confirming the loss (to recognize a provision or not). Managers and preparers could have 
done it. However, differences in provisions and contingent liabilities can arise, not exactly from management 
biases but from legitimate differences based on evidence from different events in different countries. We do not 
control for such different events for the following reasons. First, market participants use consolidated financial 
statements, in which corporate and accounting information is not about one single company but about one 
reporting entity, including the parent company and a large range of subsidiaries. Controlling for events under the 
application of IAS 37 that are similar or similarly treated by different entities would imply an extremely small 
sample with almost unique cases (within-company context). Second, market participants usually have a portfolio 
of different investments. If they are rational and unbiased by cognitive reasons, they analyse the aggregate 
amounts of all companies and interpret provisions and contingent liabilities globally (based on definitions of IAS 
37). Third, all entities provide information about the “key assumptions and estimates” used in the preparation of 
financial statements. Most, if not all, include contingencies in this section, based on lack of control or lack of 
knowledge of future events but usually not identifying any particular event except the call to judgement used on 
them. 
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exist when financial reporting requires judgment and estimation (e.g., Choi et al., 1997; Campbell, 
Sefcik & Soderstrom, 2003; Davis-Francis et al., 2004; Choudhary, 2011). If investors do not adjust 
financial statement totals for the obligations implied in some disclosures, then those investors might 
misinterpret leverage (e.g., Imhoff & Thomas, 1988) or other accounting measures. Provisions and 
contingent liabilities are an excellent area to test judgement but not measurement, as the basis for 
measurement is the same for both (i.e., measured by the “best estimate” according to IAS 37). Our 
research will firstly explore whether there is a relationship between provisions recognized and 
between contingent liabilities disclosed with share prices. 
Our explorative research is then extended to analyse if the relationship between provisions 
and contingent liabilities with share prices is more intensified or mitigated according to the 
classification of different cultural environments. More precisely, we chose two national cultural 
environments using two different countries as proxies: Portugal and the United Kingdom. The rankings 
attributed by Hofstede to these countries (Figure 16) match the accounting value assumptions that 
Gray (1988) also used to group countries into different clusters. Portugal (Figure 2) demonstrates 
greater conservatism and secrecy than the United Kingdom, consistent with Hofstede’s dimension 
scores. The different clusters justify the way preparers classify contingent liabilities and contingent 
assets (e.g., Tsakumis, 2007) and the way preparers understand probability thresholds (e.g., Du et al., 
2016). This paper relies not on preparer’s but investor’s perspectives. We extend previous works on 
provisions and contingencies linked to environmental issues analysed in a context of one country 
alone (Moneva & Cuellar, 2009) or an industry alone (e.g., Campbell, Sefcik, & Soderstrom, 2003) by 
analysing two countries with a mixed set of industries.   
 
(Figure 1) 
 
 
(Figure 2) 
Theoretically, in conservative and secretive countries such as Portugal, investors would price 
provisions but not contingent liabilities. Based on cultural characteristics, Portuguese preparers would 
                                                            
6 The scores given for each dimension are taken from the Hofstede’s Center – Country Comparison Tool. It is worth 
mentioning that according to the website, the scores attributed to the 5th dimension are based on Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkov’s (2010) latest research. 
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be less transparent and have a tendency to hide information, one reason why less attention would be 
given by investors to disclosed information in comparison to recognized information. In contrast, in 
countries with low levels of conservative behaviour and secrecy (i.e., more optimistic and transparent) 
such as the UK, investors would price both types of contingencies, and both would be associated with 
share prices, regardless of their location in financial statements. In the UK preparers would assume 
more transparency and information tends to be more complete and reliable, and investors place trust 
in that information. Our research will explore whether the relationship between contingencies and 
share prices is intensified or mitigated in countries with different national cultures. 
Our explorative research design will also test market participants’ perception on the presence 
of a risk committee beyond the audit committee. Due to concerns regarding reliability, the existence of 
such a committee would suggest that investors could process information on provisions and 
contingent liabilities, considering that the figures are subject to greater scrutiny. Thereafter, the 
research will test whether investors evaluate the existence of a risk committee board. Then, a 
distinction is made between firms having a risk committee on the board of directors and those without, 
in order to see whether the effect on provisions and contingent liabilities on share prices are mitigated 
or intensified with the presence of such a committee.  
 
 
Research method and data 
As in earlier research (e.g., Davis-Friday et al., 2004; Moneva & Cuellar, 2009; Müller et al., 2015), we 
rely on basic valuation models to provide evidence on market participants’ use of information 
presented in financial statements. To measure this evidence, we define a valuation model based on 
Ohlson (1995), modelling the market value of equity as a function of book equity and residual 
earnings, as well as other information. We want to test financial information through the lens of 
investors analysing contingencies, namely, those that are as-if recognized (contingent liabilities) and 
those that are effectively recognized (provisions) in financial statements. We want also to test if 
investors positively perceive the presence of a separate risk committee on the board of directors. 
Specifically, we estimate the following OLS regression (considering the omission of firm and time 
subscripts for brevity): 
 
15 
 
𝑀𝑉 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑉 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑁𝐼 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀       (1) 
 
The dependent variable, MV, is the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year7, taken as a 
summary indicator of capital participants (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2006; Callahan et al., 2013). The 
independent variable BV is the book value of shareholders’ equity adjusted to exclude the effect of 
provisions in the statement of financial position (e.g., is calculated as the book value of shareholder´s 
equity added to the book value of provisions). The NI is the pre-tax net income at the fiscal year end. 
The binary variable LOSS assumes 1 if the firm has negative pre-tax income at the fiscal year end. 
Then, LOSS is interacted with NI to control for loss-making firms (which can be priced differently from 
other firms, e.g., Rees & Thomas, 2010). 
The two main continuous variables are PROV (book value, in euros, of provisions recognized in 
the statement of financial position) and CONT (book value, in euros, of contingent liabilities disclosed 
only in the notes).  
To avoid scale biases, all these variables are deflated by total assets (TA) (e.g., Moneva & 
Cuellar, 2009) of the firms at the end of the fiscal year. As such, all the magnitudes represent weights, 
mitigating differences between observations that are larger or smaller – the analyses become relative 
rather than absolute amounts of assets, liabilities, equity, provisions, or contingent liabilities: 
 
𝑀𝑉
𝑇𝐴
= 𝛽1
𝐵𝑉
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽2
𝑁𝐼
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑥
𝑁𝐼
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽5
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽6
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀       (2) 
 
Control variables are those commonly used in research associating accounting measures with 
market values, as follows: Size, the size of the entity measured as the natural logarithm of firms’ 
assets, as it is usually associated with share prices; Leverage, the ratio of total debt to equity; BIG 4, a 
dummy variable, assuming 1, if the firm is audited by a BIG 4 audit firm (EY, Deloitte, KPMG, or PwC) 
and 0 otherwise; XLIST, a dummy variable, assuming 1, if the firm  is listed on more than one stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise. Year and Industry effects are also included. 
Data for contingent liabilities is hand-collected directly from firms’ consolidated financial 
statements and includes only those disclosed based on the probability criteria. This information is 
usually not provided by databases, making disclosed information harder to use, highlighted by Barth, 
                                                            
7 The market value of the equity three months after fiscal year end was also used. Results are maintained.  
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Glint, & Shibano (2003) as an explanation for the different treatment of recognized versus disclosed 
amounts. We include the firm in the sample only if the information in the notes is salient and readable 
aiding the ability to process information or limiting cognitive bias. Data for other variables are retrieved 
from Thomson Worldscope Database.  
Our predictions are as follows. If market participants value both provisions and contingent 
liabilities, then the estimates for the coefficient term of PROV (β5) and of CONT (β6) should be 
statistically significant. Then, in order to test whether cultural environment influences the relationship 
between provisions and contingent liabilities, we have re-estimated Equation 2 differentiating between 
Portugal and the United Kingdom.  Portugal is more secretive, less transparent, and more 
conservative while the United Kingdom is diametrically opposed (less secretive, more transparent, and 
more optimistic).  
Additionally, to meet the opportunity to test the effect of a risk or litigation (or equivalent) 
committee on firm value, we apply all of the previous analysis augmenting Equation (2). We include an 
additional variable, Committee, assuming 1 if there is a Risk Committee (or equivalent) on the board of 
directors and 0 otherwise. The information regarding the existence of such a committee is hand-
collected from corporate governance reports. Equation 3 is as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑉
𝑇𝐴
= 𝛽1
𝐵𝑉
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽2
𝑁𝐼
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑥
𝑁𝐼
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽5
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽6
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇
𝑇𝐴
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀                                        
(3) 
 
If investors evaluate the existence of a committee for risks and litigation on the board of 
directors, β7 should be different from zero. The variable Committee is then interacted with countries, 
with provisions, and with contingent liabilities to analyse its ability to moderate the relationship 
between provisions and contingencies and investors’ perceptions in different cultural environments,  
 
Sample, descriptive statistics, and correlations 
The sample includes entities listed on the continuous market of the Euronext Lisbon (Portugal) and 
London Stock Exchange (United Kingdom). Entities such as banks or financial services were excluded 
(Code 8000 in ICB Classification, based on Worldscope item ICBIC). Due to differences in the number 
of entities listed in both stock exchanges, we tracked the following procedure. In Portugal, we have 
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chosen the 25 with the highest market capitalization. In the UK, we randomly selected the same 
number of entities from the FTSE 100. After dropping those i) with non-available or non-readable data, 
ii) with no complete annual reports during the sample period, and iii) outliers based on studentized 
residuals greater than 3 (in absolute value), the final sample includes 192 firm-year observations (time 
window: 2010-2013) all of them from entities applying IFRS in consolidated financial statements, 
which is our scope of analysis. Table 2 reports the sample distribution across industries. The 
consumer services industry is the most dominant in Portugal (38.0%), in the UK (29.6%), and in the 
set of firms considered together (33.3%), followed by industrials (23.8% in Portugal vs. 14.8% in the 
UK) and consumer goods (14.3% in Portugal vs. 22.3% in the UK), with a weight of 18.8% each in the 
pooled sample.  
 
(Table 2) 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample, as well as for the sub-samples 
of Portuguese and UK firms. When comparing both countries, all the continuous variables means and 
medians are higher for the UK firms, except for leverage and contingent liabilities, where Portugal 
boasts higher figures. The country where entities are more leveraged is also where they present more 
contingencies. However, contingent liabilities have no impact on ratios (except if investors adjust 
them) because the amounts are disclosed only in corporate reports and not in financial reports. More 
than half of the entities have a committee for risks and/or litigations on the board of directors (Pooled: 
52.1%; Portugal: 52.4%; UK: 51.9%) and almost 50% of the Portuguese firms are loss-making. Except 
for the percentage of firm-years with a risk or litigation committee on board, non-tabulated results for 
the equality of means parametric t test indicate that the mean values are statistically different for all 
the variables.  
 
(Table 3) 
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Table 4 provides correlations for the continuous variables included in the regression equations. 
Dummy variables, such as Committee, XLIST, BIG 4, Year, and Industry, were not included in the 
Pearson correlation analysis (due to being discrete and of a limited range). Based on conventional 
results in the accounting literature, the MV is positively and statistically related with BV and NI. Market 
value is also significantly associated with Size in the UK but not in Portugal. These variables, while 
showing some indications of collinearity, have no pairwise correlation coefficients exceeding 0.80, 
which is a conventional indication about the limited peril of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 1995).  
 
(Table 4) 
 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Independent and paired sample: t-tests on mean differences 
Table 5 presents an evaluation of the cell means for our primary variables, specifically, provisions 
(PROV/TA) and contingent liabilities (CONT/TA). These two variables are deflated by total assets in 
the research model, and thus are not used in euros amounts. This approach enables us to compare 
the relative proportion of these two measures over the size of the firms and is more suitable for 
comparing firms from countries with capital markets of different sizes. The data presented in these 
panels is based on accounting measures presented in consolidated financial statements. In panel A of 
Table 5 we summed up all the provisions and as-if provisions (contingent liabilities) found in financial 
statements in each country. We first use independent sample t-test to compare the mean of the weight 
on these pooled measures in Portugal with the UK equivalent. Findings reveal that, on average, the 
difference between the mean in Portugal (mean=0.065) and the mean in the UK (mean=0.053) is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels (t-test=0.964). Secondly, we separated provisions from 
contingent liabilities and performed the same test but compared these two amounts separately.  
 
(Table 5) 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results. The findings suggest that Portuguese firms are less likely to 
recognize provisions (mean = 0.012 vs. mean = 0.041) and more likely to disclose contingent liabilities 
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(mean = 0.053 vs. mean = 0.012) than UK firms. In these cases, the mean differences are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. These findings suggest that, although similar on average, regarding 
the weight of all types of contingencies presented in financial statements, Portugal and the UK differ in 
the way they report those contingencies: a preference for contingent liabilities in Portugal and for 
provisions in the UK.  These conclusions are, in part, in accordance with those of Tsakumis (2007). 
Using an experiment, he also found that Greek accountants (with a cultural environment similar to 
Portugal’s) were less likely to recognize provisions8 than US accountants (with an environmental 
culture similar to the UK), contrary to their expectations.  
Panel B of Table 5 also presents the findings for within-country t-test, comparing the mean of 
the weight of provisions recognized and contingent liabilities disclosed. Findings reveal that, on 
average, Portuguese firms are less likely to recognize provisions than contingent liabilities 
(mean=0.012 vs. mean=0.053; t=-3.270) and firms from the UK are the opposite, being more likely to 
recognize provisions than contingent liabilities (mean=0.041 vs. mean=0.012; t=6.253). These findings 
also partially corroborate those of Tsakumis (2007). His research did not compare contingent liabilities 
with provisions but rather with contingent assets, suggesting that the US was more conservative than 
Greece. This is consistent with our findings, in the sense that if entities recognize more provisions for 
the same type of event, they are more conservative, as they anticipate losses that are still potential.  
Overall, the findings of Table 5 seem to support Tsakumis’ (2007) work, extending the 
conclusions to Portugal and the UK. At least with respect to provisions and contingencies, that 
particular author argues that culture may not play a direct role in the application of recognition rules 
across cultures, as the likelihood of recognizing provisions or disclosing contingencies does not seem 
to support traditional theory.  
However, our main goal is to analyse market participants’ perception of these two accounting 
measures, which requires a different approach.  On the other hand, Hellman, Gray, Morris, & Haller 
(2015) remark upon how harmonization efforts in Europe toward IFRS adoption in the pre-2005 period 
might have reduced differences in “bottom line” terms, making these differences irrelevant. Moreover, 
from 2005 to 2010, the timeline for harmonization is arguably sufficient to mitigate cultural differences 
based on former associations (secrecy/transparency, conservatism/optimism, class A/class B, 
                                                            
8 Tsakumis (2007) used the term “recognized contingent liabilities” referring to provisions, and “disclosed contingent 
liabilities” referring to typical contingent liabilities not recorded on the balance sheet. We use provisions (when 
recognized) and contingent liabilities (when only disclosed) to be more consistent with IAS 37 terminology.  
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Common Law/Roman Law). Accordingly, “If this is the case, the international accounting classification 
patterns may not emerge” (Hellman et al., 2015: 175). 
 
[Table 6] 
 
 
 
Results of OLS regression 
The estimation of the regression Equations (2) and (3) pools all the observations cross-sectionally and 
over time. Given that a pilot estimation of the models revealed the presence of heteroskedacity in the 
residuals, all the models have been estimated using year and industry dummies. Additionally, due to 
the small size of the sample, the models were transformed using rank-based normalizing 
transformations based on the Blom’s procedure (Soloman & Sawilowsky, 2009). All statistics are 
White-adjusted (White, 1980). 
Table 6 presents the results for the coefficients estimated for Equations 2 and 3. In column (1) 
we present the results of the overall sample (Equation 2) without separation between culture 
environments. Given that we want to test the value relevance of provisions and contingent liabilities, we 
expect that the coefficients associated with these two variables will be statistically different from zero. 
The estimation gives different results for both variables but both are statistically significant, so both are 
taken into account by the market. But while the coefficient on contingent liabilities (CONT/TA) is negative 
(β=-0.182; t=-4.361), the one on provisions (PROV/TA) is positive (β=0.119; t=2.765). These results 
suggest that disclosures are discounted by market participants, but the coefficient on provisions seems 
to be not in line with earlier research, often also attributing a negative coefficient (e.g., Moneva & 
Cuellar). Although seeming to be counter-intuitive, a positive sign for provisions was also found by 
Wegener and Labelle (2017), whose results indicate that environmental provisions act as liabilities only 
for oil and gas firms that release stand-alone sustainability reports. For other firms in that industry but 
that do not have that report, as well as for the mining industry, those authors found that provisions are 
associated with higher market values. Beyond industries, Feleaga et al. (2010) conclude that national 
accounting culture exhibits a significant influence on the IFRS policies that firms apply with regard to the 
recognition and measurement of provisions, and it is still a matter of managerial discretion, whether 
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influenced by traditional accounting practices or by other factors. We are not aware whether this 
influence of culture may be extended to market participants too when pricing this information. Probably, 
including Portuguese and British firms in a single sample is not understandable because cross country 
differences exist.  
The research is then changed in Column (2), where the results of Equation 2 are adjusted and 
the dummy variable PT is added. PT is a proxy for national culture, assuming 1 when the sample firms 
are from Portugal. This variable is then interacted with provisions and with contingent liabilities. Now the 
results reveal that both provisions and contingent liabilities present a negative influence on the market 
value of firms (PROV/TA: β=-0.059 and t=-1.701; CONT/TA: β=-0.041; t=-1.021) but are statistically 
significant only for provisions. This result is consistent with the findings reported in earlier literature, 
namely, that when the disclosed amounts are reliable, identifiable, and easily processed, investors 
appear to evaluate these two figures similarly (e.g., Bratlen et al., 2013). The lack of significance of 
contingent liabilities can be related with the low number of British firms presenting this element in 
consolidated financial statements. 
In the same column, results for Portugal are rather different. The interaction of the variable PT 
shows that the value relevance of contingent liabilities is similar to that in the United Kingdom 
(PT*CONT/TA: β=-0.080; t=-1.019), namely, the inverse but no statistically significant relationship with 
market prices holds and is not intensified or mitigated. But in Portugal the influence of provisions on 
market value is different (PT*PROV/TA: β=0.294; t=3.303). The different results between Column 1 
and Column 2 suggest that national culture may play a role in the relationship between provisions and 
contingent liabilities. In fact, the interaction variable indicates that provisions are incrementally less 
negative in Portugal, but not ineludibly that the value is positive for the country by itself.  
We run again the estimation presented in Column 1 separately on the UK and Portugal 
samples (not tabulated). The inferences persist. In the UK sample provisions display negative 
coefficients, while in the Portuguese sample they are positive, and the coefficient of contingent 
liabilities is statistically significant in neither. These results are consistent with the interactions in 
Column 2. An explanation for the positive sign of provisions with market shares should be explored 
and may be linked to differences in the way Portuguese investors perceive this element.  
   Column 3 presents the results for Equation 3. In this case we want to test whether the 
presence of a risk committee (or other equivalent) is priced by the market. The coefficient on the 
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variable of interest, Committee, reveals a positive influence on stock prices (β=0.084; t=2.015). This is 
consistent with the literature showing that the presence of a separate risk committee has a positive 
stock market reaction (e.g., Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017) and a positive effect on firm performance 
(e.g, Chowdhury, 2015). The coefficients on the main variables provisions and contingent liabilities are 
consistent with those presented in Column 1 (PROV/TA: β=0.120 and t=2.774; CONT/TA: β=-0.188; 
t=-4.431).  
Our research also tests whether the influence of the existence of a risk committee on share 
prices differs according to national culture. Column 4 presents the results adjusting Equation 3 to 
include again the dummy variable PT, and this variable is interacted with the variable Committee. The 
results are consistent with Column 3, suggesting that the market evaluates positively the presence of 
the Risk committee on the board of directors (β=0.306; t=3.380), and that this influence is not more 
intensified or mitigated in Portugal (β=-0.142; t=-1.030). 
Finally, Column 5 presents the situation in which there are two moderator variables (PT and 
Committee) which jointly influence the regression of the dependent and independent variables. This 
means that Column 5 presents a regression model that has a three-way interaction of continuous 
variables. The adjusted R squared is higher when compared to the prior columns. The findings about 
the presence of a risk committee are consistent with column 4, namely, the positive relationship 
between the existence of a risk committee and share prices (Committee: β=0.362; t=4.196), and the 
interaction of PT with the variable committee is not statistically significant (PT*Committee: β=-0.161; 
t=-1.145), meaning that national culture does not change the way market participants price that 
committee. In both countries the existence of the risk committee is value relevant. 
The results showed in column 5 also reveal that there is a negative relationship between 
provisions and share prices (PROV/TA: β=-0.106; t=-1.761) but this negative influence is reduced in 
Portuguese firms (PT*PROV/TA: β=0.318; t=2.039). This result is consistent with column 2, confirming 
that national culture probably justifies the way participants in different markets evaluate provisions. 
Moreover, the mean level of provisions in Portugal is significantly lower than in the United Kingdom 
(Table 4, panel B), which may justify differences on the value relevance of both countries. Additionally, 
the existence of the risk committee in Portuguese firms does not mediate the way provisions are 
priced by the market (PT*Committee*PROV/TA: β=0.074; t=0.489).  
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Contingent liabilities, in turn, seem to have no value relevance (CONT/TA: β=-0.054; t=-
1.044), showing that investors make a difference when evaluating provisions (value relevant) and 
contingent liabilities (no relevance), despite the same direction in the relationship. The coefficient of 
the interaction of contingent liabilities with national culture is not statistically significant (PT*CONT/TA: 
β=0.041; t=0.392). However, as opposed to provisions, contingent liabilities in Portuguese firms are 
incrementally negatively associated with share prices but this relationship is statistically significant 
when those Portuguese firms have a risk committee on the board of directors 
(PT*Committee*CONT/TA: β=-0.213; t=-2.042). This may be justified by the fact that in Portugal, the 
likelihood of disclosing contingent liabilities is greater than in the UK, and is also greater than the 
likelihood of recognizing provisions (Table 4, panel B). Thereafter we also estimated again the model 
presented in Colum 6, also separately for both countries, and the findings are again consistent with 
the previous ones. In the UK sample provisions and contingent liabilities present negative coefficients 
but are statistically significant only for provisions. In the Portuguese sample provisions continue to 
obtain a non-negative coefficient, while contingent liabilities has a negative one, but only when there is 
a committee on risks on the board. Indeed, our results about provisions corroborate the findings of 
Campbell, Sefcik, & Soderstrom (2003), in the way that recognizing liabilities rather than disclosing 
them as contingent liabilities has the ability to remove some of the pricing uncertainty around these 
potential liabilities.   
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As is typical in studies using firm valuation models, alternative explanations for the results presented 
may include the effects of correlated omitted variables and measurement errors bias. Presenting 
robust tests across alternative model specification in order to mitigate correlated omitted variables is 
one of the solutions (e.g., Campbell, Sefcik, & Soderstrom, 2003). Even so, recent papers have 
discussed different methods used in the literature proposing a solution to the correlation of the 
residuals in cross-sectional and time-series dependence in accounting research (e.g., Petersen, 2008; 
Gow, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2010). Wintoki, Linck, & Netter (2012) argue that a firm’s current actions 
can affect its future actions and future performance. In the context of provisions and contingencies, a 
firm’s past decision related to recognizing or simply disclosing these amounts can affect its future 
performance, because of the reclassification that the IAS 37 permits when analysing the threshold of 
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probability. Contingent liabilities can be recognized as provisions in later periods and vice versa. This 
causal effect is referred to by Wintoki et al. (2012) as dynamic endogeneity and the authors claim that 
any study that does not recognize this source of endogeneity may be biased. We used the dynamic 
modelling approach to deal with the potential problem of endogeneity (Chowdhury, 2015), and 
accordingly lagged variables are used as the instruments for explanatory variables. A 2SLS model is 
re-estimated; we regressed the lagged variables of our models from 2010 to 2013 against the period 
2006-2009. The remaining results are consistent with our earlier regression findings. However, this 
procedure is most suitable for large samples. In addition, we run all of the equations using 
Generalized Linear Model (GLM) estimation instead of OLS estimation, and the main results are also 
maintained. The results presented in Table 6 were then tested using panel least squares with year 
fixed effects and dummies for industry effects. Given the small size of sample, some coefficients 
changed significance when standard errors were clustered by firm, even though most of our previous 
inferences were maintained, as well as the sign of each coefficient. Table 7 (Panel A) helps to make 
readers aware of the extent of the impact that our research methodology choices could have on 
inferences. We include in this table only the main variables of interest, and we present in Table 7 the 
same 5 columns as in Table 6. For each column we flag those coefficients that maintained the same 
tendency as in the previous table (with √) and the ones that lost statistical significance at conventional 
levels if standard errors were clustered by firms (with ≠). This can be understood as a limitation of this 
explorative research, and a source of motivation to open an avenue for new investigations. Including 
more firms from more national culture environments is a challenge. 
 
[Table 7] 
 
Furthermore, the Equations 2 and 3 and the results of the OLS estimation presented in Table 
6 were also performed, adjusting the scaler. Instead of scaling the main variables using total assets, 
the number of shares outstanding was also used, resulting in a share basis analysis (e.g., Barth and 
Clinch, 2009). Simultaneously, we deleted the unique observation with a negative amount on 
provisions (which could be seen as an asset). The main results are maintained. After deleting that 
unique observation, we used the Cook’s distance (COO) statistic to identify cases which may be 
having an excessive influence on the overall model (removing all the observations with COO>4/191, 
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as the usual rule of thumb). We run the models again using the number of shares as deflator, and 
report the results in Panel B of Table 7. We use the same flags as in Panel A to signalize similarities 
and differences when comparing outcomes using different deflators. The coefficient on provisions 
remains positive in some models. Furthermore, we winsorize the continuous variables at the 1 and 99 
percentiles in the OLS regressions using those two different deflators (scaling the continuous 
independent variables by total assets and by the number of shares) and the provisions continues to 
present a positive sign in some models (not tabulated). These findings are consistent with Wegner and 
Labelle (2016) who found that instead of downwardly adjusting stock prices to reflect the future 
settlement of the obligation, investors appear to be evaluating some provisions positively. Specifically, 
they found that Canadian firms in the oil and gas industry that do not release stand-alone CSR reports 
environmental provisions convey valuation instead of liability information.  
The positive sign of the relationship between provisions (main variable or interactions) and 
market value is some of our results is driven by Portuguese firms. The recognition of provisions 
instead of the merely disclosure as contingent liabilities (with no impacts on total liabilities) could 
indicate “good” news through the firm’s willingness to estimate higher costs or commitment to lower 
reported earnings. Supported in the arguments of Wegner and Labelle (2016), only strong firms can 
afford to outline this decrease in their earnings, also evidenced in earlier research on bank loan 
provisions, which have been shown to have a positive impact on market value in some studies (Liu 
and Ryan, 1995; Kanagaretnam, Krishnan and Lobo, 2009). On the other hand, the decision to include 
provisions in the statement of financial position is supported in accountants’ beliefs that it is more likely 
than not that the payout to settle the obligation will occur. But accountants in a high conservatism 
country, such as Portugal, assign a lower numerical probability to verbal probability expressions that 
determine the threshold for the recognition of items that decrease income than accountants in a low 
conservatism country, such as the UK (Doupnik and Riccio, 2006).  If the market “(…) believes that a 
firm will not be held accountable for these likely or conditional obligations, it dramatically alters the 
impact this “bad” news component may have on market value” (Wegner and Labelle, 2016: 149). Our 
exploratory study, thus, support future research on national culture factors and on the way as 
investors interpret and process the information about provisions presented in financial statements with 
a larger number of countries. For instance, how do legal and cultural forces interact in ways that 
exacerbate or mitigate the effect of contingencies on market price, ii) how does culture affect the way 
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in which investors judge and evaluate provisions and contingent liabilities s across various industries, 
market settings and type of organizations, or iii) to what extent is the relationship between 
contingencies and debt markets influenced by different institutional environments. 
 
Conclusion 
We analyse whether market participants’ price recognized and disclosed contingencies differently 
when setting firm value. We used the same firms during the same time period with both provisions 
and/or contingent liabilities. Five main conclusions emerge. First, there are differences in the weights 
of provisions recognized and contingencies disclosed in the financial statements in Portugal and in the 
United Kingdom. Second, there is no tendency for a greater recognition of provisions in Portugal or a 
higher propensity for disclosure in the UK. This seems to contradict the theoretical approach of Gray’s 
hypotheses for high secrecy (transparency) and high conservatism (optimism) in countries with high 
(low) uncertainty avoidance such as Portugal (UK). Going ahead with the findings, the third suggestion 
is that provisions and contingencies have a negative association with share prices, but is not 
statistically significant for contingencies. But in Portugal, while contingent liabilities are incrementally 
negatively associated with share prices, the negative relationship between provisions and share prices 
is mitigated. We suggest that the national culture environments in each country dictate the way that 
investors interpret and process the provisions presented in financial statements in different countries. 
Fourthly, in both countries the market participants evaluate positively the existence of a risk committee 
on the board, which can contribute to a better assignment on the contingencies to be recognized in 
financial statements or simply disclosed. Finally, when the risk committee is introduced in the model 
as a prior omitted variable, the prior results on the relationship between provisions and contingent 
liabilities with share prices are maintained but not exactly for Portugal. In Portugal, investors discount 
on share prices the contingent liabilities disclosed if the firm has a risk committee board.  
Our findings may be of interest to the IASB in relation to its IAS 37 research project (IFRS 
Foundation, 2016), which is currently at the assessment stage. Staff identified some problems with 
IAS 37, and conducted informal outreach with representatives of some accounting firms and preparers 
of financial statements, who reported that they have few problems applying IAS 37 in practice and see 
no need for a fundamental review of the whole Standard. However, users of financial statements 
(where marker participants are included), standard-setters, regulators, and accountancy bodies 
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expressed a different view, some describing the research project on the IAS 37 as important (high or 
medium) and urgent (high or medium). Among other things, staff reported that the scope of the project 
should include updating IAS 37 to make its requirements consistent with the definition of a liability and 
the concepts supporting that definition in the revised Conceptual Framework, but not a review of the 
existing recognition criteria. The recognition criteria are applied by preparers, who say that they have 
few problems. However, users have called special attention to the criteria, and some of these users 
are in the market, valuing or not the information recognized and/or disclosed in financial statements. 
No discussion paper on possible amendments to IAS 37 will be issued until the revisions to the 
conceptual framework are finalized. 
This paper has some limitations. Many entities can report the maximum amount payable, 
rather than a best estimate, for contingencies, while measurement of provisions is more likely to reflect 
the best estimate. While we analysed all the content on notes, and we believe the firms in the sample 
used the best estimate for both, our reading could be biased. We acknowledge this aspect as a 
limitation, because we did not control for situations in which the best estimate versus maximum 
amount payable could occur, interpreting both would be the same. Another limitation related with this 
is that prior research into pricing of recognized versus disclosed amounts includes processing costs in 
the model, especially when the measurement basis is not the same between both. Based on our 
content analysis, we assume that the basis of measurement used by the entities was the same (best 
estimate), and we did not include differential processing costs in the model. Lastly, we used two 
countries having different cultural environments. However, potentially there is a diverse set of other 
characteristics between countries that could justify differences in the value relevance of contingencies 
between countries. With only two countries it is difficult to include other magnitudes and evaluate how 
this would affect pricing. Thus, our limitations open an avenue for future research. Our explorative 
study can be extended in order to: i) include more countries from different cultural environments, and 
ii) include other economic, reporting, and market characteristics to control for the effect on pricing.  
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Table 1: Comparison of a contingent liability as reported and as-if liabilities 
 Panel A: As reported  Panel B: As-if liabilities 
Statement of financial position:    
[1]   Total assets 664,592 thousand euros  664,592 thousand euros 
[2]   Total shareholders’ equity 191,452 thousand euros  166,992 thousand euros 
[3]   net income     2,078 thousand euros  -22,382 thousand euros 
[4]   Total liabilities 473,140 thousand euros  497,600 thousand euros 
[5]   Provisions        344 thousand euros    24,808 thousand euros 
Notes:    
[6]   Contingent liabilities      24.46 million euros                       0 
    
Weights:     
        [7]   Provisions on total liabilities ([5]/[4]) 0.07%  4.99% 
        [8]   Provisions on total assets       ([5]/[1]) 0.05%  3.73% 
    
Ratios:    
        [9] ROE [=[3]/[2]] 1.09%  -13.4% 
       [10] Leverage: Debt/equity ([4]/[2]) 247.13%  297.98% 
       [11] Leverage:  Debt/assets (4]/[1]) 71.2%  74.9% 
 
  
34 
 
Figure 1 - Hofstede's Cultural Dimension Scores for Portugal and UK 
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Figure 2 – Gray’s measurement and disclosure, comparative position between Portugal and UK   
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Table 2: Sample composition by country and by industry 
Industry 
 Portugal United Kingdom All 
 N % N % N % 
Oil and gas  0 0 12 11.1 12 6.3 
Basic materials  4 4.8 12 11.1 16 8.3 
Industrials  20 23.8 16 14.8 36 18.8 
Consumer goods  12 14.3 24 22.2 36 18.8 
Health care  0 0 8 7.4 8 4.2 
Consumer services  32 38.0 32 29.6 64 33.3 
Utilities  4 4.8 4 3.7 8 4.2 
Technology  12 14.3 0 0 12 6.3 
Number of observations:  84 100 108 100 192 100 
Number of observations for Portugal and the UK for sample period 2010–2013; Industry classification is based on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Percentage of firms-
years with risk or 
litigation committee 
       
All (N=192) 
MV/TA 0.800 0.511 0.859 0.012 4.272  
BV/TA 0.337 0.318 0.174 -0.079 0.691  
NI/TA 0.589 0.051 0.085 -0.160 0.350  
PROV/TA 0.028 0.016 0.041 -0.002 0.288  
CONT/TA 0.029 0.002 0.078 0.000 0.534  
Size 6.476 6.562 0.924 4.445 8.361  
Leverage 0.240 0.226 0.143 0.000 0.703  
LOSS 0.234 0 0.425 0 1  
Committee      52.1% 
       
Portugal (N=84) 
MV/TA 0.200 0.132 0.190 0.012 0.842  
BV/TA 0.249 0.235 0.166 -0.079 0.643  
NI/TA -0.050 0.002 0.046 -0.160 0.130  
PROV/TA 0.011 0.009 0.014 -0.002 0.081  
CONT/TA 0.053 0.006 0.111 0.000 0.534  
Size 5.651 5.624 0.573 4.445 6.875  
Leverage 0.269 0.279 0.157 0.000 0.703  
LOSS 0.488 0 0.503 0 1  
Committee      52.4% 
       
UK (N=108) 
MV/TA 1.274 0.976 0.885 0.332 4.272  
BV/TA 0.405 0.379 0.149 0.088 0.691  
NI/TA 0.059 0.081 0.085 -0.160 0.350  
PROV/TA 0.041 0.027 0.049 0.004 0.288  
CONT/TA 0.012 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.150  
Size 7.109 6.933 0.576 6.104 8.361  
Leverage 0.218 0.195 0.128 0.000 0.523  
LOSS 0.037 0 0.189 0 1  
Committee      51.9% 
MV/TA = Market value of equity at end of the fiscal year divided by total assets at the end of the same period; BV/TA 
= Book value of shareholders’ equity adjusted to exclude the effect of provisions, divided by total assets at the end 
of the same period; NI/TA = Pre-tax net income at the fiscal year end divided by total assets at the end of the same 
period; PROV/TA = Book value of provisions recognized in the statement of financial position divided by total assets 
at the end of the same period; CONT = Book value of contingent liabilities disclosed only in the notes divided by 
total assets at the end of the same period; Size = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal period; 
Leverage = debt-to-equity ratio at the end of fiscal year. Loss = binary variable, coded as 1 if pre-tax income is 
negative and 0 otherwise; Committee = binary variable, coded as 1 if the company has a risk committee on the 
board and 0 otherwise. 
 
  
38 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix for the main continuous variables 
All (N=192) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) MV/TA 1       
(2) BV/TA 0.302** 1      
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000       
(3) NI/TA 0.623** 0.251** 1     
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000      
(4) PROV/TA 0.091 0.437** 0.111 1    
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.214 0.000 0.127     
(5) CONT/TA -0.231** 0.020 -0.277** -0.041 1   
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.782 0.000 -0.569    
(6) Size 0.323** 0.372** 0.415** 0.467** -0.159** 1  
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028   
(7) Leverage -0.455** -0.680** -0.468** -0.214** 0.065 -0.456** 1 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.374 0.000  
 
Portugal (N=84) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) MV/TA 1           
(2) BV/TA 0.110** 1         
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000       
(3) NI/TA 0.318** 0.108 1       
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.333      
(4) PROV/TA 0.191 0.030 0.214 1     
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.064 .787 0.052     
(5) CONT/TA -0.244** 0.168 -0.243* -0.096 1   
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026 0.128 0.027 0.386    
(6) Size -0.176 -0.002 0.079* 0.341** -0.005 1  
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.112 0.984 0.477 0.002 0.961   
(7) Leverage 0.048 -0.648** -0.076 0.265* -0.175 0.159 1 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.666 0.000 0.497 0.016 0.114 0.150  
 
UK (N=108) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) MV/TA 1           
(2) BV/TA 0.046** 1         
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000       
(3) NI/TA 0.779** -0.159 1       
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.100      
(4) PROV/TA -0.241* 0.467** -0.248** 1     
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.013 0.000 0.010     
(5) CONT/TA -0.192* 0.196 -0.163 0.285** 1   
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.050 0.042 0.091 0.003    
(6) Size 0.432** 0.085 -3.383** 0.358** 0.324** 1  
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.001   
(7) Leverage -0.138 -0.507** -0.071 -0.023 -0.071 0.058 1 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 0.160 0.000 0.466 0.813 0.468 0.550  
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MV/TA = Market value of equity at end of the fiscal year divided by total assets at the end of the same period; 
BV/TA = Book value of shareholders’ equity adjusted to exclude the effect of provisions, divided by total assets at 
the end of the same period; NI/TA = Pre-tax net income at the fiscal year end divided by total assets at the end of 
the same period; PROV/TA = Book value of provisions recognized in the statement of financial position divided by 
total assets at the end of the same period; CONT = Book value of contingent liabilities disclosed only in the notes 
divided by total assets at the end of the same period; Size = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the 
fiscal period; Leverage = debt-to-equity ratio at the end of fiscal year. Loss = binary variable, coded as 1 if pre-tax 
income is negative and 0 otherwise; Committee = binary variable, coded as 1 if the company has a risk committee 
on the board and 0 otherwise. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5: Independent and Paired Sample tests 
 
Panel A: Comparison of the mean of provisions & contingent liabilities pooled  
  
 
Independent sample t-test 
 
  Portugal U.K. 
Mean difference t-test 
  (n=84) (n=108) 
 
Provisions & 
Contingent 
liabilities 
 
0.065 
 
0.053 0.012 0.964 
 
 
Panel B: Comparisons of means for primary variables – provisions and contingent liabilities 
  
Independent sample t-test 
 
  Portugal U.K. 
Mean difference t-test 
  (n=84) (n=108) 
Paired sample 
   t-test 
Provisions 
 
0.012 
 
0.041 -0.029 -5.363*** 
Contingent 
liabilities 
 
0.053 
 
 
0.012 
 
0.041  3.748*** 
 
Mean difference 
-0.041 0.029   
 
 
t-test 
 
-3.270*** 
 
6.253*** 
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Table 6: Results of the OLS Estimation 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Constant  -0.797  0.311**  -0.132  0.002  0.189 
  (-0.505)  (1.868)  (-0.846)  (0.017)  (1.250) 
BV/TA  0.162***  0.171***  0.170***  0.204***  0.179*** 
  (2.411)  (2.807)  (2.911)  (3.394)  (2.965) 
NI/TA  0.884***  0.745***  0.869***  0.727***  0.648*** 
  (11.062)  (10.180)  (11.557)  (11.472)  (9.569) 
LOSS  0.001  0.177  0.002  0.210*  0.206* 
  (0.997)  (1.371)  (0.016)  (1.673)  (1.671) 
LOSSxNI/TA  -0.651***  -0.577***  -0.637***  -0.548***  -0.437*** 
  (-5.611)  (-5.429)  (-5.712)  (-5.502)  (-4.249) 
PROV/TA  0.119***  -0.059*  0.120***  0.088**  -0.106* 
  (2.765)  (-1.701)  (2.774)  (2.022)  (-1.761) 
CONT/TA  -0.182***  -0.041  -0.188***  -0.131***  -0.054 
  (-4.361)  (-1.021)  (-4.431)  (-3.579)  (-1.044) 
PT    -0.897***    -0.925***  -1.006*** 
    (-5.073)    (-4.532)  (-5.179) 
PT* PROV/TA    0.294***      0.318** 
    (3.303)      (2.039) 
PT* CONT/TA    -0.080      0.041 
    (-1.019)      (0.392) 
Committee      0.084**  0.306***  0.362*** 
      (2.015)  (3.380)  (4.196) 
PT*Committee        -0.142  -0.161 
        (-1.030)  (-1.145) 
PT*Committee*PROV/TA          0.074 
          (0.489) 
PT*Committee*CONT/TA          -0.213** 
          (-2.042) 
           
Controls  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Adjusted R2  0.824  0.863  0.825  0.865  0.876 
Number of observations  192  192  192  192  192 
Main variables: MV/TA = Market value of equity at end of the fiscal year divided by total assets at the end of the 
same period; BV/TA = Book value of shareholders’ equity adjusted to exclude the effect of provisions, divided by 
total assets at the end of the same period; NI/TA = Pre-tax net income at the fiscal year end divided by total assets 
at the end of the same period; PROV/TA = Book value of provisions recognized in the statement of financial position 
divided by total assets at the end of the same period; CONT = Book value of contingent liabilities disclosed only in 
the notes divided by total assets at the end of the same period; PT = binary variable, coded as 1 the firm is from 
Portugal and 0 otherwise; Loss = binary variable, coded as 1 if pre-tax income is negative and 0 otherwise; 
Committee = binary variable, coded as 1 if the company has a risk committee on the board and 0 otherwise. 
Controls: Size = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal period; Leverage = debt-to-equity ratio at 
the end of fiscal year; XLIST = binary variable, coded as 1 if the firm is listed in more than one stock exchange and 
0 otherwise; BIG 4 = binary variable, coded as 1 if the firm is audited by a big 4 audit company and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variables for years and for ICB Industries included. 
 
*** p-value <0.001; ** p-value <0.01; * p-value <0.05 
The t-statistics are White-adjusted (White, 1980). 
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Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis  
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
Panel A: standard errors clustered by firm  
 PROV/TA  0.139** √  -0.052 ≠  0.138** √  0.094 ≠  -0.114 ≠ 
 CONT/TA  -0.159*** √  -0.019 √  -0.168*** √  -0.116*** √  -0.041 √ 
 PT     -0.914*** √     -0.917*** √  -0.997*** √ 
 PT* PROV/TA     0.312*** √        0.354* √ 
 PT* CONT/TA     -0.077 √        0.053 √ 
 Committee        0.106 ≠  0.378*** √  0.423*** √ 
 PT*Committee           -0.241 √  -0.252 √ 
 PT*Committee*PROV/TA              0.057 √ 
 PT*Committee*CONT/TA              -0.228 ≠ 
 
Panel B: OLS Regression using number of shares as deflator  
 PROVpershare  0.171*** √  -0.003 ≠  0.170*** √  0.134*** √  -0.057 ≠ 
 CONTpershare  -0.127*** √  -0.025 √  -0.139*** √  -0.085*** √  -0.055 √ 
 PT     -0.461*** √     -0.564*** √  -0.517*** √ 
 PT* PROVpershare     0.243*** √        0.184 ≠ 
 PT* CONTpershare     -0.070 √        0.021 √ 
 Committee        0.169*** √  0.264*** √  0.0208** √ 
 PT*Committee           -0.041 √  -0.041 √ 
 PT*Committee*PROVpershare              -0.065 ≠ 
 PT*Committee*CONTpershare              -0.033 ≠ 
 
Panel A: PROV/TA = Book value of provisions recognized in the statement of financial position divided by total 
assets at the end of the same period; CONT/TA = Book value of contingent liabilities disclosed only in the notes 
divided by total assets at the end of the same period; PT = binary variable, coded as 1 the firm is from Portugal and 
0 otherwise; Committee= binary variable, coded as 1 if the company has a risk committee on the board and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Panel B: PROVpershare = Book value of provisions recognized in the statement of financial position divided by 
number of shares outstanding at the end of the same period; CONTpershare = Book value of contingent liabilities 
disclosed only in the notes divided by number of shares outstanding at the end of the same period; PT = binary 
variable, coded as 1 the firm is from Portugal and 0 otherwise; Committee= binary variable, coded as 1 if the 
company has a risk committee on the board and 0 otherwise. 
 
*** p-value <0.001; ** p-value <0.01; * p-value <0.05 
 
 
